President Richard Nixon is our great visionary of global power politics, though George Kennan set the tone for Richard Nixon to ascend to greatness as our world leader

Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai toast during Nixon’s 1972 visit to China

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Head and shoulders portrait of a dignified man in his forties, wearing a suit and tie.

tremendous international relations strategist George F. Kennan

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http://www.philly.com/philly/wires/ap/news/politics/20130214_ap_apexclusivedocumentsdetailnixonclintonties.html

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AP Exclusive: Documents detail Nixon, Clinton ties

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In the final months of his life, Richard Nixon quietly advised President Bill  Clinton on navigating the post-Cold War world, even offering to serve as a  conduit for messages to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and other government  officials, newly declassified documents show.

Memos and other records show Nixon’s behind-the-scenes relations with the  Clinton White House. The documents are part of an exhibit opening Friday at the  Nixon Presidential Library, marking the centennial of his birth.

Clinton has talked often of his gratitude to Nixon for his advice on foreign  affairs, particularly Russia. In a video that will be part of the exhibit,  Clinton recalls receiving a letter from the 37th president shortly before his  death on April 22, 1994, at a time when Clinton was assessing U.S. relations “in  a world growing ever more interdependent and yet ungovernable.”

“I sought guidance in the example of President Nixon, who came to the  presidency at a time in our history when Americans were tempted to say, `We’ve  had enough of the world,'” Clinton says in the video. “But President Nixon knew  we had to continue to reach out to old friends and to old enemies alike. He knew  America could not quit the world.”

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The documents from late February and early March 1994 show Nixon, then 81, in  his role of elder statesman. It was two decades after he left the White House in  disgrace during Watergate.

The exhibit is an attempt to present a fuller picture of Nixon. It includes  the wooden bench he often warmed as a second-rate football player in college,  and illustrates events often eclipsed by the scandal that drove him from  office.

Media reports from the time discussed interaction between Nixon and Clinton  before his trip, including a phone call. The records, provided to The Associated  Press by the library, fill in the backstory, detailing Nixon’s advice as well as  his willingness to assist U.S. interests abroad.

They include a confidential National Security Council memo from a senior  Clinton aide who spent three hours with Nixon, shortly before the former  president would make his 10th, and final, trip to Russia that year.

The aide, R. Nicholas Burns, writes that Nixon is generally supportive of  White House policy on Russia but thinks the administration has not been tough  enough when it comes to Russia’s dealings with its neighbors. Nixon also advises  that U.S. aid to Russia should be linked to U.S. security aims, such as nuclear  balance and a reduced threat from the Russian military, rather than emphasizing  the value of domestic reforms there.

Nixon also offered to carry messages to Yeltsin and others as his own, the  memo says.

The documents, released through Clinton’s presidential library for the  exhibit, also include talking points Clinton apparently used in his call with  Nixon.

Nixon’s trip to Russia was followed closely in the media, in part because  Yeltsin froze the former president out of the Kremlin and took away bodyguards  and a limousine the government had provided for him after Nixon held meetings  with Yeltsin adversaries.

Yeltsin later backed off and urged Russian officials and parliament members  to meet with Nixon.

In another glimpse into their relationship, a handwritten note will be on  display from Nixon to Clinton that praises the former Arkansas governor’s 1992  presidential campaign that helped put him in the White House. Nixon said the  campaign was one of the best he had ever witnessed.

“The strongest steel must pass through the hottest fire. In enduring that  ordeal you have demonstrated that you have the character to lead not just  America but the forces of peace and freedom in the world,” Nixon wrote.

Clinton in his younger days was no fan of Nixon , as a college student in the  1960s, he opposed escalation of the Vietnam War. And his wife, former Secretary  of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, was a young lawyer advising a House committee  when she helped draw up impeachment papers against Nixon.

But Clinton’s views changed. He led the nation in paying tribute to Nixon at  his funeral in California in April 1994, declaring, “May the day of judging  President Nixon on anything less than his entire life and career come to a  close.”

He later told interviewer Larry King that he was deeply grateful for Nixon’s  counsel since he took office and wished he could call the former president for  advice.

Clinton echoed that statement in the video tribute.

“After he died, I found myself wishing I could pick up the phone and ask  President Nixon what he thought about this issue or that problem, particularly  if it involved Russia. I appreciated his insight and advice and I’m glad he  chose, at the end of his life, to share it with me,” Clinton says.

MICHAEL R. BLOOD  The Associated Press

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Containment

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Containment was a United States policy using numerous strategies to prevent the spread of communism abroad. A component of the Cold War, this policy was a response to a series of moves by the Soviet Union to enlarge communist influence in Eastern Europe, China, Korea, Africa , and Vietnam. It represented a middle-ground position between détente and rollback.

The basis of the doctrine was articulated in a 1946 cable by U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan. As a description of U.S. foreign policy, the word originated in a report Kennan submitted to U.S. Defense Secretary James Forrestal in 1947, a report that was later used in a magazine article. It is a translation of the French cordon sanitaire, used to describe Western policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1920s.

The word containment is associated most strongly with the policies of U.S. President Harry Truman (1945–53), including the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a mutual defense pact. Although President Dwight Eisenhower (1953–61) toyed with the rival doctrine of rollback, he refused to intervene in the Hungarian Uprising of 1956. President Lyndon Johnson (1963–69) cited containment as a justification for his policies in Vietnam. President Richard Nixon (1969–74), working with his top advisor Henry Kissinger, rejected containment in favor of friendly relations with the Soviet Union and China; this détente, or relaxation of tensions, involved expanded trade and cultural contacts.

President Jimmy Carter (1976–81) emphasized human rights rather than anti-communism, but dropped détente and returned to containment when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. President Ronald Reagan (1981–89), denouncing the Soviet state as an “evil empire“, escalated the Cold War and promoted rollback in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Central programs begun under containment, including NATO and nuclear deterrence, remained in effect even after the end of the war.

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/D%C3%A9tente

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Détente (French pronunciation: ​[detɑ̃t], meaning “relaxation”)[1] is the easing of strained relations, especially in a political situation.

The term is often used in reference to the general easing of geo-political tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States which began in 1971, as a foreign policy of U.S. presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford called détente; a ‘thawing out’ or ‘un-freezing’ at a period roughly in the middle of the Cold War. Détente was known in Russian as разрядка (“razryadka“, loosely meaning “relaxation of tension”).

The period was characterized by the signing of treaties such as the SALT I and the Helsinki Accords. A second Arms-Limitation Treaty, SALT II, was discussed but never ratified by the United States. There is still ongoing debate amongst historians as to how successful the détente period was in achieving peace.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, The two superpowers agreed to install a direct hotline between Washington DC and Moscow (the so-called red telephone), enabling leaders of both countries to quickly interact with each other in a time of urgency, and reduce the chances that future crises could escalate into an all-out war. The U.S./U.S.S.R. détente was presented as an applied extension of that thinking. The SALT II pact of the late 1970s continued the work of the SALT I talks, ensuring further reduction in arms by the Soviets and by the US. The Helsinki Accords, in which the Soviets promised to grant free elections in Europe, has been called a major concession to ensure peace by the Soviets.

Détente ended after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, which led to America’s boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. Ronald Reagan‘s election as president in 1980, based in large part on an anti-détente campaign: “Détente … Isn’t that what a turkey has with his farmer–until Thanksgiving Day?” marked the close of détente and a return to Cold War tensions. In his first press conference, president Reagan said “‘Détente’ has been a one-way street that the Soviet Union has used to pursue its aims.”

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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_F._Kennan

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George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American adviser, diplomat, political scientist, and historian, best known as “the father of containment” and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War. He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers. He was also a core member of the group of foreign policy elders known as “The Wise Men“.

In the late 1940s, his writings inspired the Truman Doctrine and the U.S. foreign policy of “containing” the Soviet Union, thrusting him into a lifelong role as a leading authority on the Cold War. His “Long Telegram[1] from Moscow in 1946 and the subsequent 1947 article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be “contained” in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts quickly emerged as foundation texts of the Cold War, expressing the Truman administration‘s new anti-Soviet Union policy. Kennan also played a leading role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, notably the Marshall Plan.

Soon after his concepts had become U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the foreign policies that he had seemingly helped launch. Subsequently, prior to the end of 1948, Kennan was confident the state of affairs in Western Europe had developed to the point where positive dialogue could commence with the Soviet Union. His proposals were discounted by the Truman administration and Kennan’s influence was marginalized, particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed secretary of state in 1949. Soon thereafter, U.S. Cold War strategy assumed a more assertive and militaristic quality, causing Kennan to lament over what he believed was as an aberration of his previous assessments.

In 1950, Kennan left the Department of State—except for two brief ambassadorial stints in Moscow and Yugoslavia—and became a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. He continued to be a leading thinker in international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death at age 101 in March 2005.

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Differences with Acheson

Kennan’s influence rapidly declined under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the successor of the ailing George Marshall in 1949 and 1950. Acheson did not regard the Soviet “threat” as chiefly political, and he saw the Berlin blockade starting in June 1948, the first Soviet test of a nuclear weapon in August 1949, the Communist revolution in China a month later, and the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950 as evidence of his view. Truman and Acheson decided to delineate the Western sphere of influence and to create a system of alliances backed by conventional and nuclear weapons.

This policy was written as NSC-68, a classified report issued by the United States National Security Council in April 1950 and written by Paul Nitze, Kennan’s successor as director of policy planning. Kennan and Charles Bohlen, another State Department expert on Russia, fought over the wording of NSC-68, which emerged as the blueprint for waging the Cold War. Kennan rejected the idea that Stalin had a grand design for world conquest implicit in Nitze’s report and argued that he actually feared overextending Russian power. Kennan even argued that NSC-68 should not have been drafted at all, as it would make U.S. policies too rigid, simplistic, and militaristic. Acheson overruled Kennan and Bohlen, backing up the view of the Soviet menace in NSC-68.

Kennan opposed the building of the hydrogen bomb and the rearmament of Germany, which were policies backed up by the assumptions of NSC-68. During the Korean War (which began when North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950), when rumors started circulating in the State Department that plans were being made to advance beyond the 38th parallel into North Korea, a move that Kennan considered highly dangerous, he engaged in intense arguments with Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East Dean Rusk, who apparently supported Acheson’s goal to forcibly unite the Koreas.

Kennan lost influence with Acheson, who in any case relied much less on his staff than Marshall had. Kennan resigned as director of policy planning in December 1949 but stayed in the department as counselor until June 1950. Acheson replaced Kennan with Nitze in January 1950, who was far more comfortable with the calculus of military power. Afterwards, Kennan accepted an appointment as Visitor to the Institute for Advanced Study from fellow moderate Robert Oppenheimer, Director of the Institute.

Despite his influence, Kennan was never really comfortable in government. He always regarded himself as an outsider and had little patience with critics. W. Averell Harriman, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow when Kennan was deputy between 1944 and 1946, remarked that Kennan was “a man who understood Russia but not the United States.”

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Kennan and the Eisenhower administration

Kennan returned to Washington, where he became embroiled in disagreements with Dwight D. Eisenhower‘s hawkish secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.   Even so he was able to work constructively with the new administration. In the summer of 1953 President Eisenhower asked Kennan to chair the first of a series of top-secret teams, dubbed Operation Solarium, examining the advantages and disadvantages of continuing the Truman administration’s approach of containment and of seeking to “roll back” existing areas of Soviet influence. Upon completion of the project, the president appeared to endorse the group’s recommendations.

By lending his prestige to Kennan’s position, the president tacitly signaled his intention to formulate the strategy of his administration within the framework of its predecessor’s, despite the misgivings of some within the Republican Party. The critical difference between the Truman and Eisenhower approaches to containment had to do with Eisenhower’s concerns that the United States could not indefinitely afford high military spending. The new president thus sought to minimize costs not by acting whenever and wherever the Soviets acted (a strategy designed to avoid risk) but rather whenever and wherever the United States could afford to act.

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Academic career and later life

In 1957 Kennan was invited by the BBC to give the annual Reith Lectures—a series of six radio lectures, which were titled Russia, the Atom and the West. For these, Kennan explored the history, impact, and possible consequences of relations between Russia and the West.

After the end of his brief ambassadorial post in Yugoslavia in 1963, Kennan spent the rest of his life in academe, becoming a leading realist critic of U.S. foreign policy. Having spent 18 months as a scholar at the Institute for Advanced Study between 1950 and 1952, Kennan permanently joined the faculty of the Institute’s School of Historical Studies in 1956.  During his career there, Kennan wrote seventeen books and scores of articles on international relations. He won the Pulitzer Prize for History,  the National Book Award for Nonfiction,the Bancroft Prize, and the Francis Parkman Prize for Russia Leaves the War, published in 1956.   He again won a Pulitzer and a National Book Award in 1968 for Memoirs, 1925–1950. A second volume, taking his reminiscences up to 1963 was published in 1972. Among his other works were American Diplomacy 1900–1950, Sketches from a Life, published in 1989, and Around the Cragged Hill in 1993.

His properly historical works amount to a six-volume account of the relations between Russia and the West from 1875 to his own time; the period from 1894 to 1914 was planned but not completed. He was chiefly concerned with:

  • The folly of the First World War as a choice of policy; he argues that the costs of modern war, direct and indirect, predictably exceeded the benefits of removing the Hohenzollerns.
  • The ineffectiveness of summit diplomacy, with the Conference of Versailles as a type-case. National leaders have too much to do to give any single matter the constant and flexible attention which diplomatic problems require.
  • The Allied intervention in Russia of 1918–19. He was indignant with Soviet accounts of a vast capitalist conspiracy against the world’s first worker’s state, some of which do not even mention the World War; he was equally indignant with the decision to intervene as costly and harmful. He argues that the interventions may by arousing Russian nationalism, have ensured the survival of the Bolshevik state.

Realism

Political realism formed the basis of Kennan’s work as a diplomat and diplomatic historian and remains relevant to the debate over American foreign policy, which since the 19th century has been characterized by a shift from the Founding Fathers’ realist school to the idealistic or Wilsonian school of international relations. In the realist tradition, security is based on the principle of a balance of power, whereas the Wilsonian view (considered impractical by realists) relies on morality as the sole determining factor in statecraft. According to the Wilsonian approach the spread of democracy abroad as a foreign policy is key and morals are universally valid. During the Presidency of Bill Clinton, American diplomacy reflected the Wilsonian school to such a degree that those in favor of the realist approach likened President Clinton’s policies to social work. According to Kennan, whose concept of American diplomacy was based on the realist approach, such moralism without regard to the realities of power and the national interest is self-defeating and will lead to the erosion of American power.

In his historical writings and memoirs, Kennan laments in great detail the failings of democratic foreign policymakers and those of the United States in particular. According to Kennan, when American policymakers suddenly confronted the Cold War, they had inherited little more than rationale and rhetoric “utopian in expectations, legalistic in concept, moralistic in [the] demand it seemed to place on others, and self-righteous in the degree of high-mindedness and rectitude…to ourselves.”  The source of the problem is the force of public opinion, a force that is inevitably unstable, unserious, subjective, emotional, and simplistic. Kennan has insisted that the U.S. public can only be united behind a foreign policy goal on the “primitive level of slogans and jingoistic ideological inspiration.”

Containment in 1967, when he published the first volume of his memoirs, involved something other than the use of military “counterforce.” He was never pleased that the policy he influenced was associated with the arms build-up of the Cold War. In his memoirs, Kennan argued that containment did not demand a militarized U.S. foreign policy.  “Counterforce” implied the political and economic defense of Western Europe against the disruptive effect of the war on European society.   Exhausted by war, the Soviet Union posed no serious military threat to the United States or its allies at the beginning of the Cold War but rather an ideological and political rival.

In the 1960s, Kennan criticized U.S. involvement in Vietnam, arguing that the United States had little vital interest in the region.  In Kennan’s view, the Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, Japan, and North America remained the arenas of vital U.S. interests. In the 1970s and 1980s, he emerged as a leading critic of the renewed arms race as détente was scrapped.

In 1989 President George H. W. Bush awarded Kennan the Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor. Yet he remained a realist critic of recent U.S. presidents, urging the U.S. government to “withdraw from its public advocacy of democracy and human rights,” saying that the “tendency to see ourselves as the center of political enlightenment and as teachers to a great part of the rest of the world strikes me as unthought-through, vainglorious and undesirable.” These ideas were particularly applicable to U.S. relations with China and Russia. Kennan opposed the Clinton administration’s war in Kosovo and its expansion of NATO (the establishment of which he had also opposed half a century earlier), expressing fears that both policies would worsen relations with Russia. He described NATO enlargement as a “strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions.”

Kennan remained vigorous and alert in the last years of his life, although arthritis had him using a wheelchair. In his later years, Kennan concluded that “the general effect of Cold War extremism was to delay rather than hasten the great change that overtook the Soviet Union.”  At 98 he warned of the unforeseen consequences of waging war against Iraq. He warned that launching an attack on Iraq would amount to waging a second war that “bears no relation to the first war against terrorism” and declared efforts by the Bush administration to link al Qaeda with Saddam Hussein “pathetically unsupportive and unreliable.”   Kennan went on to warn:

Anyone who has ever studied the history of American diplomacy, especially military diplomacy, knows that you might start in a war with certain things on your mind as a purpose of what you are doing, but in the end, you found yourself fighting for entirely different things that you had never thought of before…. In other words, war has a momentum of its own and it carries you away from all thoughtful intentions when you get into it. Today, if we went into Iraq, like the president would like us to do, you know where you begin. You never know where you are going to end.

In February 2004 scholars, diplomats, and Princeton alumni gathered at the university’s campus to celebrate Kennan’s 100th birthday. Among those in attendance were Secretary of State Colin Powell, international relations theorist John Mearsheimer, journalist Chris Hedges, former ambassador and career Foreign Service officer Jack F. Matlock, Jr., and Kennan’s biographer, John Lewis Gaddis.

Use of Institutions

Kennan was critical of America’s attempt to extend its influence abroad through the use of institutions. From his perspective, attempting to extrapolate our domestic politics to other nations through international regimes was a dangerous proposition. Kennan states, “In the first place, the idea of the subordination of a large number of states to an international juridicial regime, limiting their possibilities for aggression and injury to other states, implies that these are all states like our own, reasonably content with their international borders and status, at least to the extent that they would be willing to refrain from pressing for change without international agreement.”   Rather than tying our hands to other states by investing our power in institutions, he advocated keeping power on the state level and focusing on maintaining the balance of power abroad to protect America’s domestic security interests.

Death and legacy

Kennan died on March 17, 2005, at age 101 at his home in Princeton, New Jersey. He was survived by his wife Annelise, whom he married in 1931, and his four children, eight grandchildren, and six great-grandchildren.  Annelise died in 2008 at the age of 98.

In an obituary in the New York Times, Kennan was described as “the American diplomat who did more than any other envoy of his generation to shape United States policy during the cold war” to whom “the White House and the Pentagon turned when they sought to understand the Soviet Union after World War II.” Of Kennan, historian Wilson D. Miscamble remarked that “[o]ne can only hope that present and future makers of foreign policy might share something of his integrity and intelligence.” Foreign Policy described Kennan as “the most influential diplomat of the 20th century.”  Henry Kissinger said that Kennan “came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history,”  while Colin Powell called Kennan “our best tutor” in dealing with the foreign policy issues of the 21st century.

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Historian Wilson D. Miscamble argues that Kennan played a critical role in shaping the foreign policies of the Truman administration. He also states that Kennan did not hold a vision for either global or strongpoint containment; he simply wanted to restore the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. Like historian John Lewis Gaddis, Miscamble concedes that although Kennan personally preferred political containment, his recommendations ultimately resulted in a policy directed more toward strongpoint than to global containment.

Hispanics

Kennan deplored the Hispanicization of the United States. Noting the large-scale Mexican immigration in the Southwest, Kennan in 2002 saw “unmistakable evidences of a growing differentiation between the cultures, respectively, of large southern and southwestern regions of this country, on the one hand”, and those of “some northern regions”. In the former, “the very culture of the bulk of the population of these regions will tend to be primarily Latin-American in nature rather than what is inherited from earlier American traditions…Could it really be that there was so little of merit [in America] that it deserves to be recklessly trashed in favor of a polyglot mix-mash?”

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Herbert Hoover’s just published magnum opus on countering FDR’s WWII & post-WWII Cold War thinking    —    go to the last 15 minutes of this video [41-56 min.]  —

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http://www.c-span.org/History/Events/The-Presidency-Hoover39s-quotSecret-Historyquot/10737437583/

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Utter idiot Dick Cheney   —

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/opinion/dowd-repent-dick-cheney.html?ref=maureendowd&_r=0

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“If I had to do it over again,” the 72-year-old says chillingly of his reign of error, “I’d do it over in a minute.”       

Cheney, who came from a family of Wyoming Democrats, says his conservative bent was strengthened watching the anti-Vietnam war protests at the University of Wisconsin, where he was pursuing a doctorate and dodging the draft.       

“I can remember the mime troupe meeting there and the guys that ran around in white sheets with the entrails of pigs, dripping blood,” he said. Maybe if he’d paid more attention to the actual war, conducted with a phony casus belli in a country where we did not understand the culture, he wouldn’t have propelled America into two more Vietnams.       

The documentary doesn’t get to the dark heart of the matter about the man with the new heart.       

Did he change, after the shock to his body of so many heart procedures and the shock to his mind of 9/11? Or was he the same person, patiently playing the courtier, once code-named “Backseat” by the Secret Service, until he found the perfect oblivious frontman who would allow him to unleash his harebrained, dictatorial impulses?       

Talking to Cutler in his deep headmaster’s monotone, Cheney dispenses with the fig leaf of “we.” He no longer feigns deference to W., whom he now disdains for favoring Condi over him in the second term, and for not pardoning “Cheney’s Cheney,” Scooter Libby.       

“I had a job to do,” he said.       

Continuing: “I got on the telephone with the president, who was in Florida, and told him not to be at one location where we could both be taken out.” Cheney kept W. flying aimlessly in the air on 9/11 while he and Lynne left on a helicopter for a secure undisclosed location, leaving Washington in a bleak, scared silence, with no one reassuring the nation in those first terrifying hours.       

“I gave the instructions that we’d authorize our pilots to take it out,” he says, referring to the jet headed to Washington that crashed in a Pennsylvania field. He adds: “After I’d given the order, it was pretty quiet. Everybody had heard it, and it was obviously a significant moment.”       

This guy makes Al Haig look like a shrinking violet.       

When they testified together before the 9/11 Commission, W. and Cheney kept up a pretense that in a previous call, the president had authorized the vice president to give a shoot-down order if needed. But the commission found “no documentary evidence for this call.”       

In his memoir, W. described feeling “blindsided” again and again. In this film, the blindsider is the éminence grise who was supposed to shore up the untested president. The documentary reveals the Iago lengths that Cheney went to in order to manipulate the unprepared junior Bush. Vice had learned turf fighting from a maniacal master of the art, his mentor Donald Rumsfeld.       

When he was supposed to be vetting vice presidential candidates, Cheney was actually demanding so much material from them that there was always something to pick on. He filled W.’s head with stories about conflicts between presidents and vice presidents sparked by the vice president’s ambition, while protesting that he himself did not want the job.       

In an unorthodox move, he ran the transition, hiring all his people, including Bush senior’s nemesis, Rummy, and sloughing off the Friends of George; then he gave himself an all-access pass.       

He was always goosing up W.’s insecurities so he could take advantage of them. To make his crazy and appallingly costly detour from Osama to Saddam, and cherry-pick his fake case for invading Iraq, he played on W.’s fear of being lampooned as a wimp, as his father had been.       

But after Vice kept W. out of the loop on the Justice Department’s rebellion against Cheney’s illegal warrantless domestic spying program, the relationship was ruptured. It was too late to rein in the feverish vice president, except to tell him he couldn’t bomb a nuclear plant in the Syrian desert.       

“Condi was on the wrong side of all those issues,” Cheney rumbled to Cutler.       

Cheney still hearts waterboarding. “Are you going to trade the lives of a number of people because you want to preserve your honor?” he asked, his voice dripping with contempt.       

“I don’t lie awake at night thinking, gee, what are they going to say about me?” he sums up.       

They’re going to say you were a misguided powermonger who, in a paranoid spasm, led this nation into an unthinkable calamity. Sleep on that.   

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 clueless Jeane Kirkpatrick   —

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 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeane_Kirkpatrick#Reagan.27s_Cabinet

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She was one of the strongest supporters of Argentina‘s military dictatorship following the March 1982 Argentine invasion of the United Kingdom’s Falkland Islands, which triggered the Falklands War. Kirkpatrick had a “soft spot” for Argentina’s President Gen. Leopoldo Galtieri, and favored neutrality rather than the pro-British policy favored by the Secretary of State Alexander Haig.  The British ambassador Sir Nicholas Henderson described her as “..more fool than fascist..she appears to be one of America’s own-goal scorers, tactless, wrong-headed, ineffective, and a dubious tribute to the academic profession to which she [expresses] her allegiance.”  The administration ultimately decided to declare support for the British, thus forcing her to vote yes to UN resolution 502.

At the 1984 Republican National Convention, Kirkpatrick delivered the “Blame America First” keynote speech,which re-nominated Reagan by praising his administration’s foreign policy while excoriating the leadership of what she called the “San Francisco Democrats”—the Democrats had just held their convention in San Francisco—for the party’s shift away from the hawkish policies of former Democratic presidents such as Harry S. Truman and John F. Kennedy to a more strident anti-war position that the left-wing of the Democratic Party had pushed since Vietnam. It was the first time since the 1952 speech from Douglas MacArthur that a non-party member had delivered the Republican convention keynote address.

Kirkpatrick, a member of the National Security Council, did not get along with either Secretary of State Haig or his successor, George Schultz. She disagreed with Schultz most notably on the Iran-Contra affair, in which she supported skimming money off arms sales to fund the Contras. Kirkpatrick and Schultz were most at odds over whether to find extra funding for Nicaraguan contras, with Schultz telling Kirkpatrick that it was an “impeachable offense.” Kirkpatrick wished to be Secretary of State or head of the National Security Council, which did not help either.   Shultz threatened to resign if Kirkpatrick was appointed National Security Adviser.   Kirkpatrick was more closely allied with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and head of the CIA, William J. Casey.

  

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