People who habitually choose unrealistic goals allow wishful thinking to override their grip on common sense. Appraise how realistic your goals are and set your expectations appropriately. — Mark Goulston

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http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=images+anxiety&qpvt=images+anxiety&FORM=IGRE#view=detail&id=F09126190842AF2F75C770B2B96C88837E92E2EF&selectedIndex=24

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https://www.achievesolutions.net/achievesolutions/en/Content.do?contentId=3159

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Overcoming needless self-defeating behavior/suffering  caused by  unrealistic expectations

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I encourage my patients to appraise how realistic their goals are and to set
their expectations appropriately. If your goal is unrealistic, don’t go after it
with a “gotta have it” attitude.

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“Nation-building” in the 21st century   —

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http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/rand-study-tries-to-focus-on-lessons-from-iraq-and-afghanistan-but-what-have-we-learned/2014/06/09/a92e990c-ee72-11e3-b84b-3393a45b80f1_story.html

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Whatever the U.S. military learned in the 1960s and 1970s in Vietnam about fighting insurgents was forgotten, requiring almost five years after the 2003 invasion of Iraq for the adoption of Gen. David Petraeus’s counterinsurgency doctrines. Transferred to Afghanistan, forms of the doctrines have become basic to the military.

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One apparent post-Iraq outcome, according to Rand, is the avoidance of “large-scale, prolonged stability operations” in favor of “small-scale contingency operations,” with a recognition that stability and counterinsurgency activities may be required after any combat against a major country.

There is also mounting appreciation for the value of “local intelligence” carried out by “lower-level units, whereby local intelligence about tribes, networks [and] economic issues . . . could be effectively collected and exploited,” the Rand study said.

One of the most effective counterinsurgency tools for the military, Rand said, was the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which — after some trial and error — allowed lower-level officers to use readily available funds “to repair battle damage, make condolence payments or start local reconstruction projects.” Used to better results in Afghanistan, Rand believes CERP “will hopefully inform future missions should they arise.”

One result from Iraq has been the growth of military civil affairs units, but the biggest gainer for the future has been Special Operations Command, which has increased to almost 70,000 while the size of Pentagon’s overall force levels decline.

Another effect of Iraq, according to Rand, is concern about combat casualties. While the fatalities have been far lower than in Korea or Vietnam, the ratio of wounded-to-killed was “higher than ever before, largely as a result of advances in battlefield medical treatment.” According to Rand, “these relatively low casualty rates may increase public expectations that future wars can and should be fought without losing large numbers of U.S. troops.”

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Cost is another factor. Iraq and Afghanistan were the first wars in which a president did not seek a tax increase to pay for the fighting. That was the case with George W. Bush when he invaded Iraq and with Obama when he added troops in Afghanistan. The bills are still coming in for both.

The Cost of War Project, based at Brown University, has projected veterans’ benefitsfrom the Iraq war alone could top $450 billion. In the decade since 2001, the Pentagon’s base budget increased 40 percent in real terms, and though it has dropped since its 2010 peak, it is higher than “defense spending during the Reagan administration, at least in real dollars,” the Rand study said.

What costs are those advocating increased intervention in Syria and Ukraine willing to pay in terms of casualties and funds?

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